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PRIMARY JURISDICTION AND EXHAUSTION OF
ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES
The concepts of primary jurisdiction and exhaustion of administrative
remedies lie at the very heart of the administrative process. Both of these
concepts have in large part been judicially evolved.
PRIMARY

JURISDICTION

The primary jurisdiction doctrine determines whether administrative
and judicial jurisdiction are concurrent, or whether the initial decisions
must be made by the administrative agency.1 This problem ordinarily
arises in a context in which conceivably both the courts and an agency have
jurisdiction as distinguished from a situation in which the statute clearly
places exclusive original jurisdiction in the agency, as for example, licensing
statutes. A legislative enactment in such instances gives an administrative
2
commission exclusive jurisdiction over the subject matter.
The father of the theory is Texas & Pacific Railroad Co. v. Abilene
Cotton Co.3 which held that although the Interstate Commerce Act provided that the administrative remedies set out therein were to be in addition to judicial remedies, the initial determination was to be made exclusively by the Commission. Action is initiated in a court, and the court
is then confronted with the question of whether to apply this doctrine of
primary and exclusive jurisditcion. Of course, Constitutional questions
are subject to review by -the Supreme Court, despite action by the administrative body as a result of the application of the doctrine.
Several tests have been applied by state and federal courts to make
the doctrine more definitive. Mr. Justice Brandeis stated it should be
applied when the "enquiry is essentially one of fact and discretion in
technical matters. '"4
Brandeis suggested in the Merchants Elevator case,
that when the ruling depends solely upon non-technical judicial determination typically made by a court, the court will not apply the doctrine.
When a private agreement is required by law to conform to the rules
and regulations of an agency, it is necessary that the agency determine its
validity according to those rules before a judicial opinion may be sought
on the question of its legality.5 Such exclusive jurisdiction must be enforced in order adequately to develop standards which are fair to the
public, create uniformity, fully utilize the expertise of the agency, and
thoroughly process and consider each case. The courts should not have
the right or burden of establishing the policies of administrative programs.
1.

Davis, Administrative Law, § 197 (1951).

2.
3.

D.C. 1960).
Peter Fox Brewing Co. v. Sohio Petroleum Co., 189 F. Supp. 743 (Ill.
Tex. & Pac. R. Co. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 204 U.S. 426, 27 S.Ct. 350, 51 L.Ed.
553 (1922).
Great Northern R. Co. v. Merchants Elevator Co., 259 U.S. 285, 42 S.Ct. 477, 66
LEd. 943 (1922).
Thompson v. Texas-Mexican R. Co., 328 U.S. 570, 66 S.Ct. 937, 90 L.Ed. 1132 (1946).

4.
5.

[290]

NoTEs

With the idea of allowing the Commission the right to interject its
policy into all the phases of a dispute, the courts have rendered decisions
that have, in effect, departed from the Brandeis thinking that a question
of law may initially be decided by a court. The rationale is that the
question of law should first go to the agency if it is better prepared to
answer it, especially if the purpose is to invoke agency policy., However,
the agency decision is not final, as the court may on judicial review sub7
stitute its judgment on a question of law for that of the agency.
When a litigant seeks the aid of a court without first resorting to
the agency, the result of the application of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction is the dismissal of the case" rather than a stay of the proceedings.
Wyoming, in contrast with the federal and national view, has followed
the theory of concurrent jurisdiction in at least one area. Either the
court or the agency is recognized as being initially capbale of handling a
10
water adjudication proceeding. Simmons v. Ramsbottom, held that the
right of the Board of Control to adjudicate water rights of contending
parties in individual cases is not exclusive, but that such rights may be
adjudicated by the courts in cases in which that has not been done by the
Board of Control. The decision is predicated upon the omission of an
explicit expression of the intention of the Legislature to make the

jurisdiction exclusive. Without such expressed intent the jurisdiction
in equity was considered to exist concurrently with that of the Commissioners.
There were, however, some practical and historical reasons for refusing to apply the doctrine of primary jurisdiction in the case of water
adjudication and it does not follow that the Constitution intended to give
The Board exclusive jurisdiction, for when the Board was created, it was
confronted with many difficulties. Few adjudications of priorities had
been made by the courts. The work load that confronted the Board was
mountainous. The Legislature in some instances made limited appropriations so that years elapsed before the Board was able to make even a
small percentage of the adjudications that were necessary. Therefore, the
courts determined that concurrent jurisdiction was necessary in order to
fully consider and promptly decide these cases.
The Simmons' court found that adjudication was an incident of
administration proceedings; however, it stated that under the Wyoming
Constitution a court may always be resorted to for the purpose of answering questions of law where concurrent jurisdiction is otherwise feasible."
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.

Federal Maritime Board v. Isbrandtsen Co., 356 U.S. 481, 78 S.Ct. 851, 2 L.Ed.2d
926 (1958).
Federal Maritime Board v. Isbrandtsen Co., supra at 498.
Montana-Dakota Utilities Co. v. Northwestern Public Service Co., 341 U.S. 246, 71
S.Ct. 692, 95 L.Ed. 912 (1951).
General American Tank Car Corp. v. El Dorado Terminal Co., 308 U.S. 422, 60
S.Ct. 325, 84 L.Ed. 361 (1940).
Simmons v. Ramsbottom, 51 Wyo. 419, 68 P.2d 153 (1937).
Simmons v. Ramsbottom, supra.
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From this it may be deduced that the courts as well as the agency may
initally answer questions of law which corresponds with Justice Brandeis'
theory.
Laramie Rivers Co. v. LeVasseur 12 reaffirms the Simmons' rule as
to concurrent jurisdiction of courts to decide water rights and on whether
the doctrine applies to questions of law.
ExHAUSTION

OF

ADMINISTRTIVE

REMEDIES

Complementing the theory of primary jurisdiction is that of exhaus-

tion of administrative remedies: there may be no judicial relief for an
injury until the prescribed administrative remedies have been exhausted.
The leading federal case is Meyers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp.,13 in
which the corporation filed a bill in equity to enjoin a hearing on an
unfair labor practice charges made against the company before the N.L.R.B.
The Supreme Court ruled that since the corporation had not exhausted its
remedies before the N.L.R.B., injunction would not lie.
The foremost exception to the exhaustion rule is a finding of a clear
lack of agency jurisdiction over the problem at hand, particularly in the
area of federal vs. state jurisdiction. A condition precedent to the claim
of this exception is the allegation that exhaustion will involve irreparable

injury to the petitioner. Public Utilities Commission
Co. 14 establishes the test that if there is a clear lack
the petitioner will suffer irreparable harm from the
haustion doctrine will not be applied. In the United
a plain lack of jurisdiction in the state agency, due to
of gas rates.

v. United Fuel Gas
of jurisdiction and

exhaustion, the exFuel case there was
federal pre-emption

An alternative to the condition precedent of irreparable harm is that
termed "inadequacy of administrative remedies." In Smith v. Ill. Bell Tel.
Co.,' 5 the agency had allowed a question of proper rates to lie dormant
for years. This delay in ousting "confiscatory rates" was considered by the
court as rendering the administrative remedy inadequate; hence, the court
allowed equitable relief. Thus, a petitioner does not have to wait indefinitely for agency action on a pending application.

A further exception to the exhaustion rule is that if the legislation,
i.e., the enabling statute, is challenged as being clearly unconstitutional,
the exhaustion doctrine may not be applied. A Wyoming case, State v.
Hull,16 applies this reasoning.

"Exhaustion" in this case included a review

by the state courts by certiorari as part of the administrative procedure.
The Wyoming Supreme Court held that exhaustion was not required, be12.
13.

14.
15.
16.

Laramie Rivers Co. v. LeVasseur, 65 Wyo. 414, 202 P.2d 680 (1949).
Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp.,303 U.S. 41, 58 S.Ct. 459, 82 L.Ed. 638

(1938).
Public Utilities Commission of Ohio v. United Fuel Gas Co., 317 U.S. 456, 63 S.Ct.
369, 87 L.Ed. 396 (1943).
Smith v. Ill. Bell Tel. Co., 270 U.S. 587, 46 S.Ct. 408, 70 L.Ed. 747 (1926).
State v. Hull, 65 Wyo. 251, 199 P.2d 832 (1948).

NOTES

cause the proper remedy to test the constitutionality of a zoning ordinance
is mandamus not certiorari. The court said that despite the fact that the
question of constiutionality could have been reviewed by the court on
administrative appeal, ".

.

. the general

rule requiring exhaustion of

statutory remedy is not an absolute one, and must give way where justice
requires it."
The theory of the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies
was applied by the U.S. Supreme Court at the administrative level in
Hillsbarough v. Cromwell,' 7 in which a taxpayer had a constitutional issue
resolved without exhausting state administrative remedies. The reasoning
was that the Commission cannot make the ultimate decision. (Contra
reasoning is logical: a litigant may win at the board level, so there is no
need for a decision on constitutional issues.)
A further question is whether a court of review violates the exhaustion
doctrine when it considers an issue that is not raised before the Commission. In exceptional cases, to obtain an equitable result, courts will
consider issues that are not raised at board level.18
New Jersey uniquely has adopted the exception to the exhaustion rule
that where only an error of law by the agency is involved, the court may
decide that it can 'be judicially settled without requiring exhaustion of
agency remedies. A plaintiff claimed that the denial by a building
inspector of his application to use a building as a hotel was arbitary and
unreasonable. The court held: "Where appeal to an intermediate body
would be futile gesture, it is not required, since reasonable speed is still
an essential part of substantial justice."' 9
Whether an application for rehearing at the administrative level is
essential to exhaust agency remedies is dependent upon the statute involved. When the statute makes rehearing mandatory, the exhaustion
doctrine may be extended through a rehearing before the judicial review
20
will become available.
Section 10 of the Federal Administrative Procedure Act2 1 is exemplary
of a statute that dispenses with the necessity of applying for a rehearing,
as it states that agency action will be final whether or not any application
has been made for "reconsideration." So after the decision the petitioner
22
is not required to apply for rehearing but may if a statute permits.
A Wyoming case, Hamilton Pipe Co. v. Stanolind,23 held that the
rehearing application is optional with the petitioner. Wyo. Stat. § 37-40
(1957) states: "At any time after an order has been made by the Commis17.

Hillsborough Tp. Somerset County v. Cromwell, 326 U.S. 620, 66 S.Ct. 445, 90
L.Ed. 358 (1946).

18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

Hormel v. Helvering, 312 U.S. 552, 61 S.Ct. 719, 85 L.Ed. 1037 (1941).
Honigfeld v. Byrnes, 14 N.J. 600, 103 A.2d 598 (1954).
French v. Industrial Commission, 85 Colo. 173, 274 Pac. 742 (1929).
5 U.S.C. § 1009.
Levers v. Anderson, 326 U.S. 219, 66 S.Ct. 72, 90 L.Ed. 26 (1945).
Hamilton v. Stanolind Pipe Co., 65 Wyo. 350, 202 P.2d 184 (1948).
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sion any person interested may apply for a rehearing in respect to any
matter determined therein." The court interpreted this as a permissive
statute that the word "may" "operates to confer discretion."
The last category is the statute that is silent on the subject of rehearing. The majority view as indicated by a Louisiana case is that such
a statute does not demand a rehearing in order to satisfy the exhaustion
doctrine. 24 As to a second rehearing when one rehearing is required under
the exhaustion doctrine, the better view (unless there is a reversal of the
first award which allows the aggrieved party a choice of a second rehearing
or judicial review) is that only one rehearing is required. 25
At present no Wyoming statutes directly refer to the doctrines of
primary jurisdiction and exhaustion; however, Wyo. Stat. § 37-50 (1957)
and Wyo. Stat. § 15-62 (1957) imply that interlocutory relief is available
as an exception to the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies in
the form of an injunction upon application to the district court to prevent
a stay while appeal continues if the existing situation would cause imminent
peril to life or property.
THE PROBLEMS OF PRIMARY JURISDICTION AND EXHAUSTION

AS

AFFECTED BY THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT AND THE
MODEL STATE ADMINISTRATIVE

PROCEDURE

ACT

The doctrine of primary jurisdiction has evolved primarily from

interpretations by the judiciary although Wyoming predicates its application on specific legislative intent.

No direct mention of primary juris-

diction is made by the Administrative Procedure Act or the Model State
Act. Section 10(c) of the Administrative Procedure Act 26 incorporates
exhaustion doctrine thinking when it provides that preliminary action,
e.g., an examiner's initial decision, will not be final action by the agency.
The Colorado Act 2 7 raises the issue of exhaustion by specifically
mentioning the exception in Section 5 (4) : "Upon a finding that irreparable
injury would otherwise result, the agency, upon application therefor, shall
postpone the effective date of the agency action pending judicial review ...." It goes on to specify that an injunction may be granted when
there is projected an irreparable injury and the proposed agency action is
beyond its constitutional or statutory jurisdiction.
Section 15 of the Revised Model State Administrative Act 28 makes
the applicable statement that, "Any preliminary, procedural, or intermediate agency act or ruling is immediately reviewable in any case in
which review of the final agency decision would not provide an adequate
remedy."
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

Hunter v. Hussey, 90 So.2d 429 (La. 1956).
Dalsheim v.Industrial Accident Commission, 215 Cal. 107, 8 P.2d 840 (1932).
Administrative Procedure Act supra.
Colo. Rev. Stat. § 3-16-4(5), 1960 Cum. Supp.
State Administrative Procedure Act (fourth draft), 9c U.L.A. 174.

NOTES
SUMMARY AND

CONCLUSIONS

a. While it is true that the doctrine of primary jurisdiction is judgemade, Wyoming would profit from a statute that requires initial action
be brought at the administrative level for the purpose of determining questions of fact and mixed questions of law and fact. As it stands, there is
some precedent in Wyoming for concurrent jurisdiction between the courts
and the agencies. This is unsatisfactory, as it may result in unnecessary,
costly litigation which may be a burden on the courts and deprive the
participants and the courts the benefit of the expertise of the agency and
uniform policies.

b. A line should be drawn as to when the doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies should be strictly enforced. The Colorado Act
serves as a good model in reference to a projected irreparable injury and
clear lack of jurisdiction along with the question of constitutionality of
the state statute as criteria. In such situations a provision for injunctive
relief against agency action should be allowed. Finally, it should be stipulated 'by statute that there may be petition for court determination if
irreparable damage would be caused by unreasonable delay in the administrative proceedings.
GENE DUNCAN

